## SURVEY OF THE AGFHAN PEOPLE ON THE INTRA-AFGHAN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

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## BOOK DESIGN

Organization for Social Research and Analysis

## ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

The Organization for Social Research and Analysis (OSRA) is a nonpartisan and independent non-governmental organization based in Kabul. At OSRA, we conduct socio-economic research, public opinion polls, big data analytics, content analysis and a variety of data-driven research. Our mission is to facilitate fact-based transparency and research in order to support good governance and sustainable development and, above all, to promote transparency and accountability. By producing evidence-based research and high-quality data analysis, we study Afghan public attitude, demographic trends, policy impact, communication and public relations with the help of the latest technology, as well as a standardized and customized methodology to enable intelligent decision-making processes. In order to deliver meaningful messages gleaned from complex and large datasets, we focus on presenting the general public and our clients with easy to read and comprehensible information and data visualization platforms.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The survey of the Afghan people on the intra-Afghan peace process was conducted to explore the position of the Afghan population on key points and principal issues relating to the peace talks. The Afghan peace process has been lengthy and arduous, marked by breakthroughs, talks, derailments, and the collapse of talks ever since it unofficially began in 2008/9. Despite repeated impasses in the process, efforts continued in one way or another to build trust between the US and the Taliban, as well as between the Afghan government and the Taliban. In October 2018 the US government decided to engage in direct talks with the Taliban for the first time-a long-standing demand of the movement. After several rounds of talks over a period of 16 months, both sides finally reached an agreement in February 2020. The agreement contained four provisions: (1) halting attacks against US troops and interests by the Taliban, (2) reduction and withdrawal of US troops phasewise from Afghanistan, (3) releasing or swapping Afghan prisoners on both sides, and (4) starting intra-Afghan peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. ${ }^{2}$

The peace process has revolved mainly around three stakeholders: the Afghan government, the Taliban movement and the US government. This has left the Afghan peopleas the legitimizing force and key stakeholder-largel unacknowledged
with regard to their position vis-a-vis the peace-negotiations. While the Afghan government and the Taliban compete for over-representation of the Afghan people, the voices and position of the people have largely not been reflected. The intra-Afghan peace negotiations will shape the lives and future of the Afghan people. And it is the people's support-or lack of it-for principle policy changes that will determine the viability of the results of the process.

ORSA conducted a survey ofmore than 5000 people across 34 provinces of Afghanistan from December 2019 to January 2020. The aim was to identify the position of the general public regarding key points that are being negotiated during the intra-Afghan talks. The survey was divided into three key sections : (1) Political System and Security Forces (2) Women, and (3) Media and Entertainment. In line with OSRA's core values and vision, the self-funded survey was carried out to promote transparency and accountability in order to contribute to the empowerment of the Afghan people.

The margin of error in this survey was 1.4\%, calculated from an estimated proportion of $\mathrm{p}=0.5$ and a confidence interval of $95 \%$. The data was gathered using the random digit dialling (RDD) technique and a simple random sampling approach.

## MAIN FINDINGS

Is foreign troop presence necessary as a guarantee for the implementation of the peace agreement between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban?

- The majority of people $(56 \%)^{2}$ said that foreign troops' presence was not necessary for the implementation of a peace agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. However, a considerable number of people (33\%) stated that it was necessary to have foreign troops to see through the implementation of a peace agreement. Only a small number of people stated that foreign troops should remain but in limited contingency (7\%). Although more than the majority of all large ethnic groups were in favour of complete troops withdrawal, there was a statistically significant difference between the ethnic groups and their preferences. More Pashtuns were in favour of complete withdrawal (61\%) followed by Hazaras (53\%), Tajiks (52\%) and Uzbeks (52\%). Moreover, a statistical significance was observed between age groups with young people being more in favour of a complete troop withdrawal.

In a peace agreement between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban, should Taliban fighters be integrated into the Afghan National Security Forces?

- A huge majority of the people ( $73 \%$ ) were in favour of integrating Taliban fighters in the ANSF in case a peace agreement is reached. However, a noteworthy number of people ( $23 \%$ ) said they were against it. Responses varied according to ethnicity, age and gender. Pashtuns were much more in favour of integration (84\%) than Uzbeks (72\%), Tajiks (64\%), and Hazaras (60\%). Younger people between the age of $18-25$ were less in favour of integration (67\%) than the older generation (78\%). Men were significantly more in favour of fighter integration (79\%) than women (56\%).

Are you in favour of the Taliban Moral Police (Amr-bil-Maroof)?

- A sizable majority of people (63\%) were against the Taliban Moral Police. However, a considerable number of people (34\%) said they were in favour. Responses varied amongst ethnic groups, age groups, level of education and gender. Hazaras (75\%) were significantly more against the Taliban Moral Police than Pashtuns (55\%). Furthermore, there was an association between responses and level of education as well as gender. With higher education, support for the Moral Police fell. Similarly, women were significantly more likely to reject the Taliban Moral Police (76\%) compared to men (58\%).

Are you in favour of gender segregation for students in places of higher education?

- The majority of people (57\%) favoured gender segregation in places of higher education between men and women. However, a significant number of people (42\%) said they were against it. Statistically significant differences were observed between the attitudes of ethnic groups. While a sizable majority of Pashtuns (64\%) were in favour of gender segregation, the majority of Hazaras (59\%) were against it. Although no association between age or gender was observed, there was a significant association between lower educational background and being in favour of gender segregation in places of higher education.


## MAIN FINDINGS

## Which political system do you prefer?

- A huge majority of the people (73\%) preferred the "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan", followed by "A theocracy in combination with a presidential democracy"3 (15\%). Only a small number of people (4\%) preferred the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan". Responses depended on ethnic belonging. Hazara ( $81 \%$ ) showed the highest propensity for the Islamic Republic followed by Tajiks (74\%) and Uzbeks (70\%). Pashtuns showed the lowest propensity (69\%). The results also showed that Hazaras (9\%) were the least in favour of a combination of theocracy and presidential democracy (Iranian style of government) compared to Pashtuns (19\%). Although no association between age or gender was observed, there was a significant association between higher levels of education and being in favour of the Islamic Republic.


## What do you think about the role of women in politics?

- A sizable majority (66\%) stated that the role of women should increase. Simultaneously, while a decent number of people said they wanted it to remain as it is (14\%), an almost equal number said the role of women in politics should decrease (13\%). Only a small number of people (4\%) wanted to see women banned from politics. Women significantly favoured an increased role for themselves (75\%) compared to men (64\%). Although sizable majorities of all large ethnic groups were in favour of an increase in the role of women in politics, Hazaras (80\%) were more in favour compared to Tajiks (65\%), Pashtuns (64\%) and Uzbeks (61\%).

What do you think about the role of women in the Afghan National Security Forces in case of peace-agreement?

- A sizable majority of people (65\%) were in favour of increasing the role of women in the ANSF. However, a decent number wanted women's role to remain as it is (14\%), while an almost even number wanted it decreased (13\%). Only a small number wanted women banned from the ANSF (6\%). Hazaras (70\%) and Pashtuns (68\%) were significantly more in favour of increasing the role of women. No significant association was observed between age, gender or level of education in responses to this question.


## Should women work as judges in Afghanistan?

- A huge majority of people were in favour of female judges (78\%), while a noteworthy number of people (20\%) were against. A dependency between age and gender was observed. The higher age groups were more inclined to want women as judges than the younger ones. Women were more in favour of having women as judges (83\%) than men (77\%).

[^0]
## MAIN FINDINGS

## Should a woman become president of Afghanistan?

- The majority of the people (64\%) were in favour of having a woman as the head of the state. Nonetheless, a considerable number (34\%) said they were against it. The largest statistical deviation was among Hazaras (79\%) and Pashtuns (59\%). Furthermore, an association between age and preference was observed with higher age groups more likely to support a woman president. Responses were independent of gender.

What do you think about critical political programs and opinions in the media?

- A significant number of people (46\%) wished to see an increase in critical political programs and opinions. While a noteworthy number said it should decrease (26\%), a decent number wanted to see it remain as it is (16\%), and a small number wanted critical political programs and opinion to be banned (8\%). No statistical deviation was observed between responses and age groups, gender, ethnic belonging or education level.


## What do you think about the role of women in the media?

- The majority of people ( $52 \%$ ) wished to see an increase in the role of women in the media. While a noteworthy number said it should remain as it is (22\%), a decent number wanted the role of women decreased (19\%). Only a small number wanted women banned from the media (5\%). Hazaras were more in favour (69\%) of an increased role for women in the media compared to Tajiks (52\%), Pashtuns (48\%), and Uzbeks (45\%). Furthermore, the higher age groups were more in favour of an increased role of women in the media. Women were more in favour of seeing an increased role for themselves (60\%) than men(49\%).

Are you in favour of restricting entertainment programs in the media?

- Restricting entertainment programs including, series, foreign dubbed series, comedy and satire shows have been an ongoing debate among certain political and conservative circles. Upon asking the people whether such programs should be restricted, a sizable majority responded with "no" (66\%). Meanwhile, a considerable number of people were in favour of restrictions (33\%). An association was observed between the increase in the level of education and being against restricting entertainment programs in the media.
.
Are you in favour of restricting musical programs in the media?
- Restricting music programs has been an ongoing discussion in certain political and conservative circles in Afghanistan. When asked whether music programs should be restricted, a sizable majority responded with "yes" (61\%). However, a considerable number of people were against restrictions (37\%). The younger generation seemed slightly more in favour of restrictions on music programs than the higher age groups.



## METHODOLOGY

## Data Collection

The Organization for Social Research and Analysis surveyed 5213 adult respondents from all 34 provinces in Afghanistan. The survey covered a random, representative sample of men and women aged 18 and over and was conducted via phone interviews. The Random Digit Dialing (RDD) technique was applied to generate a sample based on the simple random sampling method. ${ }^{4}$ To ensure inclusive and non-discriminatory coverage, numbers from all Afghan telecommunication providers including Roshan, Etisalat, Afghan Wireless, MTN, and Salaam were used.

A survey management system application (SuMSy) was used to facilitate computerassisted telephone interviewing. SuMSy speeds up the data-gathering process, and ensures the consistency and validity of the data during the entry. It assists data gathering in telephone surveying and allows the interviewer to follow a script provided by the software.

The data gathering was conducted by experienced and trained operators who contacted respondents in order to capture their views. The operators were fluent in all the official languages of Afghanistan including Dari, Pashto, Uzbaki, and Turkmani. Female operators were specifically trained to ease the interview process for female respondents, who tend to feel more comfortable and are willing to talk to women. Each interview took 15-35 minutes, providing all participants with ample time to understand each question. Interviewees had the opportunity to clarify survey questions. After gaining the consent of each participant, the interviews were recorded and digitally stored in SuMSy.

## Questionnaire

The questionnaire was divided into three parts: (1) The political system and national security forces ; (2) Women; and (3) Media. These topics were chosen because they are the most contested-where the Afghan government and the Taliban diverge in terms of values and vision. Topics such as economy, foreign policy and national interest were deliberately not taken as neither the Afghan government nor the Taliban has shown critical divergence of values or vision here.

The questionnaire was prepared in Dari, Pashto and Uzbeki to enable wide outreach across language barriers. The questions were formulated in the same manner as they were being debated among the people, media, and social media, to ensure that they were easy to understand. Possible responses reflect the position of the Afghan government as well as that of the Taliban movement. These have been communicated through various publications, online postings as well as interviews of its members with the international press.

[^1]
## Data Quality

The Random Digit Dialing technique is very effective in generating a representative sample. It enabled OSRA to capture a large and highly representative sample in the safest way possible. Moreover, experience showed that in the culturally and highly sensitized context of Afghanistan, phone interviews provide interviewees with the time and space to respond to critical and sensitive questions without social and peer pressure from friends, bystanders or family members. Interviewees showed great enthusiasm and willingness to respond to critical questions and even provided additional information (which was not asked or registered).

Research shows that mobile phone surveys are highly accurate, presentative, and cost-effective in non-Western contexts of developing and fragile countries, especially in capturing and monitoring rapidly changing conditions, and in obtaining real-time feedback from households. ${ }^{5}$

The topics of the survey touched almost all aspects of people's daily lives in one way or another. This explains the willingness of the interviewees to share their views. Women showed an even greater willingness to respond to phone interviews with female operators as this took place in the safe environment of their home, without having a stranger enter their premises to talk to them.

To ensure the consistency and validity of the data, a two-layer quality assurance check was adopted. First, SuMSy has an integrated data validity and consistency check functionality which prevents inconsistent data entry. Second, data entries were crosschecked by a data quality control team ensuring that they reflected voiced responses. After passing these two stages, the data was released to be published on our opendata platform.

The margin of error in this poll was 1.4\%, calculated from an estimated proportion of $\mathrm{p}=0.5$ and a confidence interval of $95 \%$. A Chi square test was conducted to calculate associations and correlation between variables.

## Data Presentation

For the purpose of comprehensible and easy-to-understand presentation of the collected data, OSRA designed an open-data platform where the data can be openly accessed. This platform is very user-friendly and intuitive. Users can see the data broken down into categories and filter it according to demographic attributes, enabling them to infer varying correlations with the help of multiple concurrent filters. This allows a wide range of hypotheses to be drawn and possible conclusions to be made. The open-data platform is free and is available for the public to view and study.
www.peacetalks.osra.af
Surner


## POLITICAL SYSTEM \& SECURITY FORCES

### 2.1 FOREIGN TROOPS PRESENCE

Is foreign troops presence necessary as a guarantee for the implementation of a peace agreement between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban?

Figure 1: Foreign troops presence - Total Distribution


Table 1: Foreign troops presence - Ethnicity

| Ethnic <br> Groups | Yes | In a limited <br> contingency | No troops, <br> complete <br> withdrawal | I don't <br> know | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pashtuns | $27.4 \%$ | $7.7 \%$ | $60.8 \%$ | $2.2 \%$ | $1.6 \%$ |
| Tajiks | $36.3 \%$ | $6.6 \%$ | $52.3 \%$ | $2.3 \%$ | $2.2 \%$ |
| Hazara | $35.3 \%$ | $5.3 \%$ | $53.1 \%$ | $4.0 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ |
| Uzbek | $36.5 \%$ | $4.3 \%$ | $51.7 \%$ | $3.4 \%$ | $3.9 \%$ |

Table 2: Foreign troops presence - Level of Education

| Level of <br> Education | Yes | In a limited <br> contingency | No troops, <br> complete <br> withdrawal | I don't <br> know | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Illiterate | $28.8 \%$ | $4.4 \%$ | $60.1 \%$ | $3.9 \%$ | $2.5 \%$ |
| Primary School | $29.8 \%$ | $8.6 \%$ | $56.2 \%$ | $3.4 \%$ | $1.8 \%$ |
| High School <br> Graduate | $33.9 \%$ | $6.2 \%$ | $55.7 \%$ | $1.8 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ |
| University Graduate | $36.8 \%$ | $9.1 \%$ | $5.8 \%$ | $0.9 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ |
| Post Graduate/ <br> Masters Degree | $44.5 \%$ | $10.8 \%$ | $39.1 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ | $3.2 \%$ |

Table 3: Foreign troops presence - Age

| Age <br> Groups | Yes | In a limited <br> contingency | No troops, <br> complete <br> withdrawal | I don't <br> know | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $18-25$ | $29.7 \%$ | $6.4 \%$ | $60.2 \%$ | $2.2 \%$ | $1.2 \%$ |
| $26-35$ | $33.5 \%$ | $6.0 \%$ | $55.2 \%$ | $2.4 \%$ | $2.7 \%$ |
| $36-45$ | $35.4 \%$ | $8.3 \%$ | $49.3 \%$ | $3.4 \%$ | $3.4 \%$ |
| $46-55$ | $35.2 \%$ | $10.8 \%$ | $49.1 \%$ | $3.0 \%$ | $1.7 \%$ |
| $56+$ | $40.9 \%$ | $6.0 \%$ | $47.9 \%$ | $1.8 \%$ | $3.2 \%$ |

Table 4: Foreign troops presence - Gender

| Gender | Yes | In a limited <br> contingency | No troops, <br> complete <br> withdrawal | I don't know | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | $33.3 \%$ | $5.2 \%$ | $54.1 \%$ | $4.6 \%$ | $2.5 \%$ |
| Male | $32.3 \%$ | $7.5 \%$ | $56.3 \%$ | $1.7 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ |

### 2.2 FIGHTER INTEGRATION

In case of a peace-agreement between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban, should Taliban fighters be integrated into the Afghan National Security Forces?

Figure 2: Taliban fighter integration in ANSF - Total Distribution


Table 5: Taliban fighter integration in ANSF - Ethnicity

| Ethnic <br> Groups | Yes | No | I don't know | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pashtuns | $84.3 \%$ | $12.6 \%$ | $1.3 \%$ | $1.2 \%$ |
| Tajiks | $64.2 \%$ | $30.9 \%$ | $2.7 \%$ | $1.4 \%$ |
| Hazara | $59.8 \%$ | $35.5 \%$ | $2.6 \%$ | $1.5 \%$ |
| Uzbek | $71.7 \%$ | $23.9 \%$ | $1.7 \%$ | $2.6 \%$ |

Table 6: Taliban fighter integration in ANSF - Level of Education

| Level of <br> Education | Yes | Some of <br> them | No | I don't <br> know | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Illiterate | $77.3 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ | $17.2 \%$ | $2.7 \%$ | $2.3 \%$ |
| Primary School | $73.4 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ | $22.1 \%$ | $2.8 \%$ | $1.2 \%$ |
| High School Graduate | $70.4 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ | $26.0 \%$ | $1.5 \%$ | $1.6 \%$ |
| University Graduate | $71.0 \%$ | $1.1 \%$ | $25.3 \%$ | $1.3 \%$ | $1.0 \%$ |
| Post Graduate/Masters Degree | $71.7 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ | $26.0 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ |

Table 7: Taliban fighter integration in ANSF - Age

| Age Groups | Yes | No | I don't know | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $18-25$ | $67.2 \%$ | $29.3 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ | $1.0 \%$ |
| $26-35$ | $75.8 \%$ | $20.3 \%$ | $1.5 \%$ | $1.3 \%$ |
| $36-45$ | $79.0 \%$ | $15.7 \%$ | $2.8 \%$ | $1.9 \%$ |
| $46-55$ | $78.2 \%$ | $17.4 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ |
| $56+$ | $77.6 \%$ | $13.0 \%$ | $2.3 \%$ | $6.0 \%$ |

Table 8: Taliban fighter integration in ANSF - Gender

| Gender | Yes | No | I don't know | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | $55.6 \%$ | $38.2 \%$ | $4.1 \%$ | $1.7 \%$ |
| Male | $78.7 \%$ | $17.8 \%$ | $1.3 \%$ | $1.4 \%$ |

### 2.3 TALIBAN MORAL POLICE

Are you in favor of the Taliban moral police (Amr-bil-Maroof) after a possible peace agreement?

Figure 3: Taliban moral police - Total Distribution


Table 9: Taliban moral police - Ethnicity

| Ethnic <br> Groups | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pashtuns | $41.4 \%$ | $54.6 \%$ | $3.8 \%$ |
| Tajiks | $30.2 \%$ | $67.3 \%$ | $2.4 \%$ |
| Hazara | $24.1 \%$ | $75.0 \%$ | $0.7 \%$ |
| Uzbek | $34.4 \%$ | $62.8 \%$ | $2.6 \%$ |

Table 10: Taliban moral police - Level of Education

| Level of Education | Yes | No | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Illiterate | $45.6 \%$ | $50.1 \%$ | $4.1 \%$ |
| Primary School | $38.1 \%$ | $57.9 \%$ | $3.8 \%$ |
| High School Graduate | $31.8 \%$ | $65.6 \%$ | $2.5 \%$ |
| University Graduate | $23.6 \%$ | $74.4 \%$ | $1.9 \%$ |
| Post Graduate/Masters Degree | $20.8 \%$ | $79.1 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ |

Table 11: Taliban moral police - Age

| Age Groups | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $18-25$ | $34.5 \%$ | $62.3 \%$ | $3.0 \%$ |
| $26-35$ | $32.5 \%$ | $46.8 \%$ | $2.6 \%$ |
| $36-45$ | $34.6 \%$ | $61.6 \%$ | $3.6 \%$ |
| $46-55$ | $36.1 \%$ | $61.8 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ |
| $56+$ | $36.2 \%$ | $60.4 \%$ | $3.2 \%$ |

Table 12: Taliban moral police - Gender

| Age Groups | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | $21.9 \%$ | $75.9 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ |
| Male | $38.3 \%$ | $58.4 \%$ | $3.2 \%$ |

### 2.4 GENDER SEGREGATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Are you in favor of gender segregation for students in places of higher education?

Figure 4: Gender segregation in higher education - Total Distribution


Table 13: Gender segregation in higher education - Ethnicity

| Ethnic <br> Groups | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pashtuns | $64.6 \%$ | $34.7 \%$ | $0.6 \%$ |
| Tajiks | $54.1 \%$ | $45.1 \%$ | $0.7 \%$ |
| Hazara | $41.2 \%$ | $58.5 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ |
| Uzbek | $62.7 \%$ | $35.4 \%$ | $1.7 \%$ |

Table 14: Gender segregation in higher education - Level of Education

| Level of Education | Yes | No | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Illiterate | $71.1 \%$ | $28.0 \%$ | $0.7 \%$ |
| Primary School | $68.2 \%$ | $30.8 \%$ | $0.9 \%$ |
| High School Graduate | $53.1 \%$ | $45.8 \%$ | $0.9 \%$ |
| University Graduate | $40.1 \%$ | $59.3 \%$ | $0.5 \%$ |
| Post Graduate/Masters Degree | $27.4 \%$ | $72.5 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ |

Table 15: Gender segregation in higher education - Age

| Age Groups | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $18-25$ | $56.3 \%$ | $42.9 \%$ | $0.6 \%$ |
| $26-35$ | $56.5 \%$ | $42.9 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ |
| $36-45$ | $59.2 \%$ | $39.1 \%$ | $1.5 \%$ |
| $46-55$ | $59.8 \%$ | $38.8 \%$ | $1.2 \%$ |
| $56+$ | $57.2 \%$ | $42.3 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ |

Table 16: Gender segregation in higher education - Gender

| Age Groups | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | $54.7 \%$ | $44.3 \%$ | $0.8 \%$ |
| Male | $57.9 \%$ | $41.2 \%$ | $0.7 \%$ |

### 2.5 POLITICAL SYSTEM PREFERENCE

Which political system do you prefer?

Figure 5: Political system Preference - Total Distribution


Table 17: Political system preference - Ethnicity

| Ethnic | Islamic <br> Republic of <br> Afghanistan | Islamic Emirate <br> of Afghanistan | Combination <br> of theocracy <br> \& pres. <br> democracy | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pashtuns | $69.0 \%$ | $5.2 \%$ | $18.9 \%$ | $6.7 \%$ |
| Tajiks | $74.4 \%$ | $4.2 \%$ | $13.1 \%$ | $8.0 \%$ |
| Hazara | $80.9 \%$ | $1.9 \%$ | $9.0 \%$ | $8.0 \%$ |
| Uzbek | $70.4 \%$ | $3.0 \%$ | $14.7 \%$ | $11.7 \%$ |

Table 18: Political system preference - Level of Education

| Level of <br> Education | Islamic <br> Republic of <br> Afghanistan | Islamic <br> Emirate of <br> Afghanistan | Combination <br> of theocracy <br> \& pres. <br> democracy | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Illiterate | $62.7 \%$ | $7.1 \%$ | $17.0 \%$ | $13.0 \%$ |
| Primary School | $67.2 \%$ | $4.8 \%$ | $18.3 \%$ | $9.4 \%$ |
| High School Graduate | $76.1 \%$ | $3.6 \%$ | $14.8 \%$ | $5.3 \%$ |
| University Graduate | $82.9 \%$ | $1.6 \%$ | $10.8 \%$ | $4.5 \%$ |
| Post Graduate/Masters Degree | $76.0 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ | $11.9 \%$ | $9.7 \%$ |

Table 19: Political system preference - Age

| Age <br> Groups | Islamic <br> Republic of <br> Afghanistan | Islamic Emirate <br> of Afghanistan | Combination <br> of theocracy <br> \& pres. <br> democracy | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $18-25$ | $73.6 \%$ | $4.6 \%$ | $15.9 \%$ | $5.7 \%$ |
| $26-35$ | $72.8 \%$ | $4.1 \%$ | $14.7 \%$ | $8.3 \%$ |
| $36-45$ | $70.6 \%$ | $4.0 \%$ | $15.5 \%$ | $9.7 \%$ |
| $46-55$ | $70.7 \%$ | $2.5 \%$ | $14.1 \%$ | $12.6 \%$ |
| $56+$ | 68.8 | $5.1 \%$ | $14.8 \%$ | $11.1 \%$ |

Table 20: Political system preference - Gender

| Gender | Islamic <br> Republic of <br> Afghanistan | Islamic Emirate <br> of Afghanistan | Combination <br> of theocracy <br> \& pres. <br> democracy | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | $77.3 \%$ | $2.8 \%$ | $11.1 \%$ | $8.5 \%$ |
| Male | $70.9 \%$ | $4.7 \%$ | $16.6 \%$ | $7.6 \%$ |



## WOMEN

### 3.1 WOMEN IN POLITICS

What do you think about the role of women in politics?

Figure 6: Women in politics - Total Distribution


Table 21: Women in politics - Ethnicity

| Ethnic <br> Groups | Should be <br> increased | Remain as is | Should be <br> decreased | Should be <br> banned | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pashtuns | $63.9 \%$ | $13.7 \%$ | $13.9 \%$ | $5.6 \%$ | $2.8 \%$ |
| Tajiks | $65.4 \%$ | $14.6 \%$ | $14.2 \%$ | $3.4 \%$ | $2.2 \%$ |
| Hazara | $80.1 \%$ | $10.9 \%$ | $6.1 \%$ | $1.3 \%$ | $1.3 \%$ |
| Uzbek | $61.0 \%$ | $13.4 \%$ | $15.1 \%$ | $6.4 \%$ | $3.8 \%$ |

Table 22: Women in politics - Level of Education

| Level of <br> Education | Should be <br> increased | Remain <br> as is | Should be <br> decreased | Should be <br> banned | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Illiterate | $64.4 \%$ | $13.1 \%$ | $13.0 \%$ | $5.7 \%$ | $3.6 \%$ |
| Primary School | $61.3 \%$ | $14.7 \%$ | $16.5 \%$ | $4.6 \%$ | $2.6 \%$ |
| High School Graduate | $64.8 \%$ | $14.5 \%$ | $13.9 \%$ | $4.3 \%$ | $2.3 \%$ |
| University Graduate | $73.8 \%$ | $13.3 \%$ | $8.5 \%$ | $2.6 \%$ | $1.6 \%$ |
| Post Graduate/Masters Degree | $80.2 \%$ | $10.9 \%$ | $3.2 \%$ | $3.2 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ |

Table 23: Women in politics - Age

| Age <br> Groups | Should be <br> increased | Remain as is | Should be <br> decreased | Should be <br> banned | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $18-25$ | $62.3 \%$ | $13.1 \%$ | $17.2 \%$ | $4.7 \%$ | $2.4 \%$ |
| $26-35$ | $69.1 \%$ | $13.3 \%$ | $11.2 \%$ | $4.3 \%$ | $1.9 \%$ |
| $36-45$ | $68.5 \%$ | $15.7 \%$ | $8.5 \%$ | $4.0 \%$ | $3.0 \%$ |
| $46-55$ | $70.8 \%$ | $16.5 \%$ | $5.7 \%$ | $3.5 \%$ | $3.2 \%$ |
| $56+$ | $73.9 \%$ | $11.1 \%$ | $6.5 \%$ | $4.1 \%$ | $4.1 \%$ |

Table 24: Women in politics - Gender

| Gender | Should be <br> increased | Remain as is | Should be <br> decreased | Should be <br> banned | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | $74.9 \%$ | $11.2 \%$ | $9.7 \%$ | $2.2 \%$ | $1.7 \%$ |
| Male | $63.5 \%$ | $14.6 \%$ | $13.8 \%$ | $5.1 \%$ | $2.8 \%$ |

### 3.2 WOMEN AS JUDGES?

Should women continue working as judges in Afghanistan?

Figure 7: Women as judges - Total Distribution


Table 25: Women as judges - Ethnicity

| Ethnic Groups | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pashtuns | $76.6 \%$ | $21.6 \%$ | $1.7 \%$ |
| Tajiks | $80.0 \%$ | $18.9 \%$ | $0.9 \%$ |
| Hazara | $78.3 \%$ | $19.7 \%$ | $1.9 \%$ |
| Uzbek | $76.6 \%$ | $21.2 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ |

Table 26: Women as judges - Level of Education

| Level of <br> Education <br> Illiterate | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Primary School | $82.1 \%$ | $15.4 \%$ | $2.3 \%$ |
| High School Graduate | $\mathbf{7 7 . 2} \%$ | $18.7 \%$ | $0.9 \%$ |
| University Graduate | $73.2 \%$ | $21.2 \%$ | $1.3 \%$ |
| Post Graduate/ <br> Masters Degree | $83.6 \%$ | $16.3 \%$ | $1.2 \%$ |

Table 27: Women as judges - Age

| Age Groups | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $18-25$ | $76.2 \%$ | $22.7 \%$ | $1.0 \%$ |
| $26-35$ | $78.3 \%$ | $20.1 \%$ | $1.5 \%$ |
| $36-45$ | $79.8 \%$ | $17.7 \%$ | $2.3 \%$ |
| $46-55$ | $80.9 \%$ | $17.5 \%$ | $1.5 \%$ |
| $56+$ | $84.5 \%$ | $13.5 \%$ | $1.8 \%$ |

Table 28: Women as judges - Gender

| Gender | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | $82.6 \%$ | $15.8 \%$ | $1.4 \%$ |
| Male | $76.5 \%$ | $21.9 \%$ | $1.4 \%$ |

### 3.3 WOMAN AS PRESIDENT

Should a woman become president in Afghanistan?
Figure 8: Woman as president - Total Distribution


Table 29: Woman as president - Ethnicity

| Ethnic Groups | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pashtuns | $59.3 \%$ | $38.9 \%$ | $1.6 \%$ |
| Tajiks | $65.4 \%$ | $33.3 \%$ | $1.1 \%$ |
| Hazara | $79.0 \%$ | $19.7 \%$ | $1.1 \%$ |
| Uzbek | $64.3 \%$ | $32.1 \%$ | $3.4 \%$ |

Table 30: Woman as president - Level of Education

| Level of Education | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Illiterate | $65.6 \%$ | $32.7 \%$ | $1.5 \%$ |
| Primary School | $65.8 \%$ | $32.0 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ |
| High School <br> Graduate | $63.9 \%$ | $34.3 \%$ | $1.6 \%$ |
| University Graduate | $61.4 \%$ | $38.0 \%$ | $0.5 \%$ |
| Post Graduate/ <br> Masters Degree | $72.8 \%$ | $27.1 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ |

Table 31: Woman as president - Age

| Age Groups | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $18-25$ | $60.2 \%$ | $38.3 \%$ | $1.4 \%$ |
| $26-35$ | $66.7 \%$ | $31.7 \%$ | $1.4 \%$ |
| $36-45$ | $67.8 \%$ | $30.3 \%$ | $1.8 \%$ |
| $46-55$ | $68.3 \%$ | $30.1 \%$ | $1.5 \%$ |
| $56+$ | $69.7 \%$ | $28.3 \%$ | $1.8 \%$ |

Table 32: Woman as president - Gender

| Gender | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | $68.8 \%$ | $30.2 \%$ | $0.9 \%$ |
| Male | $62.7 \%$ | $35.4 \%$ | $1.7 \%$ |

### 3.4 WOMEN IN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

What do you think about the role of women in the Afghan National Security Forces in case of peace-agreement?

Figure 9: Role of women in the national security forces - Total Distribution


Table 33: Role of women in the national security forces - Ethnicity

| Ethnic <br> Groups | Should be <br> increased | Remain as is | Should be <br> decreased | Should be <br> banned | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pashtuns | $67.7 \%$ | $13.2 \%$ | $11.0 \%$ | $5.5 \%$ | $2.5 \%$ |
| Tajiks | $62.1 \%$ | $14.5 \%$ | $15.2 \%$ | $5.7 \%$ | $2.3 \%$ |
| Hazara | $70.3 \%$ | $13.2 \%$ | $9.4 \%$ | $4.6 \%$ | $2.3 \%$ |
| Uzbek | $57.1 \%$ | $11.6 \%$ | $20.3 \%$ | $6.0 \%$ | $4.7 \%$ |



Table 34: Role of women in the national security forces - Level of Education

| Level of <br> Education | Should be <br> increased | Remain <br> as is | Should be <br> decreased | Should be <br> banned | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Illiterate | $64.2 \%$ | $9.7 \%$ | $14.9 \%$ | $7.5 \%$ | $3.4 \%$ |
| Primary School | $61.6 \%$ | $14.1 \%$ | $15.5 \%$ | $6.4 \%$ | $2.2 \%$ |
| High School Graduate | $64.6 \%$ | $15.4 \%$ | $12.7 \%$ | $5.0 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ |
| University Graduate | $70.5 \%$ | $14.9 \%$ | $7.7 \%$ | $3.5 \%$ | $3.1 \%$ |
| Post Graduate/Masters Degree | $71.7 \%$ | $11.9 \%$ | $4.3 \%$ | $6.5 \%$ | $5.4 \%$ |

Table 35: Role of women in the national security forces - Age

| Age <br> Groups | Should be <br> increased | Remain as is | Should be <br> decreased | Should be <br> banned | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $18-25$ | $63.0 \%$ | $13.6 \%$ | $15.6 \%$ | $5.6 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ |
| $26-35$ | $67.6 \%$ | $13.1 \%$ | $11.0 \%$ | $5.3 \%$ | $2.7 \%$ |
| $36-45$ | $67.1 \%$ | $13.9 \%$ | $9.3 \%$ | $6.1 \%$ | $3.4 \%$ |
| $46-55$ | $65.6 \%$ | $15.9 \%$ | $7.5 \%$ | $6.5 \%$ | $4.2 \%$ |
| $56+$ | $66.9 \%$ | $13.0 \%$ | $10.6 \%$ | $6.0 \%$ | $3.2 \%$ |

Table 36: Role of women in the national security forces - Gender

| Gender | Should be <br> increased | Remain as is | Should be <br> decreased | Should be <br> banned | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | $64.5 \%$ | $11.7 \%$ | $14.2 \%$ | $6.8 \%$ | $2.6 \%$ |
| Male | $65.7 \%$ | $14.3 \%$ | $11.9 \%$ | $5.3 \%$ | $2.6 \%$ |


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## MEDIA

### 4.1 CRITICAL POLITICAL OPINION

What do you think about critical political programs \& opinions in the media?
Figure 10: Critical political programs \& opinions in the media - Total Distribution


Table 37: Critical political opinion in the media - Ethnicity

| Ethnic <br> Groups | Should be <br> increased | Remain as <br> it is | Should be <br> decreased | Should be <br> banned | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pashtuns | $46.5 \%$ | $15.1 \%$ | $23.3 \%$ | $10.0 \%$ | $4.9 \%$ |
| Tajiks | $45.8 \%$ | $15.6 \%$ | $28.5 \%$ | $6.7 \%$ | $3.1 \%$ |
| Hazara | $45.6 \%$ | $18.4 \%$ | $26.0 \%$ | $4.8 \%$ | $5.0 \%$ |
| Uzbek | $43.0 \%$ | $15.2 \%$ | $24.7 \%$ | $9.5 \%$ | $7.3 \%$ |

Table 38: Critical political opinion in the media - Level of Education

| Level of Education | Should be <br> increased | Remain <br> as is | Should be <br> decreased | Should be <br> banned | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Illiterate | $46.6 \%$ | $12.2 \%$ | $23.4 \%$ | $7.9 \%$ | $9.6 \%$ |
| Primary School | $45.1 \%$ | $13.4 \%$ | $27.8 \%$ | $8.1 \%$ | $5.3 \%$ |
| High School Graduate | $43.6 \%$ | $18.4 \%$ | $27.4 \%$ | $7.4 \%$ | $3.0 \%$ |
| University Graduate | $47.4 \%$ | $16.4 \%$ | $24.7 \%$ | $9.5 \%$ | $1.7 \%$ |
| Post Graduate/Masters Degree | $45.6 \%$ | $18.4 \%$ | $26.0 \%$ | $9.7 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ |

Table 39: Critical political opinion in the media - Age

| Age Groups | Should be <br> increased | Remain as is | Should be <br> decreased | Should be <br> banned | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $18-25$ | $43.6 \%$ | $16.3 \%$ | $28.4 \%$ | $8.1 \%$ | $3.4 \%$ |
| $26-35$ | $43.7 \%$ | $17.9 \%$ | $24.6 \%$ | $9.0 \%$ | $4.5 \%$ |
| $36-45$ | $50.0 \%$ | $12.4 \%$ | $23.8 \%$ | $8.2 \%$ | $5.3 \%$ |
| $46-55$ | $53.5 \%$ | $14.0 \%$ | $20.1 \%$ | $5.7 \%$ | $6.5 \%$ |
| $56+$ | $49.5 \%$ | $11.6 \%$ | $22.4 \%$ | $7.9 \%$ | $8.4 \%$ |

Table 40: Critical political opinion in the media - Gender

| Gender | Should be <br> increased | Remain as is | Should be <br> decreased | Should be <br> banned | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | $48.5 \%$ | $17.2 \%$ | $22.5 \%$ | $6.2 \%$ | $5.4 \%$ |
| Male | $44.5 \%$ | $15.4 \%$ | $26.8 \%$ | $8.9 \%$ | $4.2 \%$ |

### 4.2 WOMEN IN MEDIA

What do you think about the role of women in the media?
Figure 11: Role of women in the media - Total Distribution


Table 41: Role of women in the media - Ethnicity

| Ethnic <br> Groups | Should be <br> increased | Remain as is | Should be <br> decreased | Should be <br> banned | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pashtuns | $47.9 \%$ | $23.3 \%$ | $20.0 \%$ | $6.2 \%$ | $2.2 \%$ |
| Tajiks | $51.9 \%$ | $21.5 \%$ | $21.2 \%$ | $3.7 \%$ | $1.4 \%$ |
| Hazara | $68.7 \%$ | $19.9 \%$ | $8.6 \%$ | $1.5 \%$ | $1.1 \%$ |
| Uzbek | $44.7 \%$ | $18.6 \%$ | $28.2 \%$ | $5.2 \%$ | $3.0 \%$ |

Table 42: Role of women in the media - Level of Education

| Level of Education | Should be <br> increased | Remain <br> as is | Should be <br> decreased | Should be <br> banned | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Illiterate | $50.4 \%$ | $17.7 \%$ | $22.3 \%$ | $5.9 \%$ | $3.3 \%$ |
| Primary School | $50.6 \%$ | $18.5 \%$ | $24.1 \%$ | $5.4 \%$ | $1.2 \%$ |
| High School Graduate | $51.7 \%$ | $23.8 \%$ | $17.8 \%$ | $4.6 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ |
| University Graduate | $56.3 \%$ | $25.0 \%$ | $14.1 \%$ | $3.1 \%$ | $1.2 \%$ |
| Post Graduate/Masters Degree | $52.1 \%$ | $29.3 \%$ | $11.9 \%$ | $3.2 \%$ | $3.2 \%$ |

Table 43: Role of women in the media - Age

| Age Groups | Should be <br> increased | Remain as is | Should be <br> decreased | Should be <br> banned | Refuse to <br> answer |
| ---: | :---: | ---: | ---: | :---: | :---: |
| $18-25$ | $47.9 \%$ | $20.2 \%$ | $23.9 \%$ | $6.1 \%$ | $1.6 \%$ |
| $26-35$ | $52.8 \%$ | $23.8 \%$ | $17.1 \%$ | $4.2 \%$ | $1.8 \%$ |
| $36-45$ | $55.1 \%$ | $22.9 \%$ | $15.9 \%$ | $3.1 \%$ | $2.7 \%$ |
| $46-55$ | $58.4 \%$ | $24.6 \%$ | $12.0 \%$ | $2.5 \%$ | $2.2 \%$ |
| $56+$ | $65.5 \%$ | $18.6 \%$ | $12.5 \%$ | $1.3 \%$ | $1.8 \%$ |

Table 44: Role of women in the media - Gender

| Gender | Should be <br> increased | Remain as is | Should be <br> decreased | Should be <br> banned | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | $60.4 \%$ | $16.5 \%$ | $16.6 \%$ | $4.1 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ |
| Male | $49.1 \%$ | $23.8 \%$ | $20.2 \%$ | $4.8 \%$ | $1.8 \%$ |

### 4.3 RESTRICTING MUSICAL PROGRAMS

Are you in favor of restricting musical programs in the media?
Figure 12: Restricting musical programs in the media - Total Distribution


Table 45: Restricting musical programs in the media - Ethnicity

| Ethnic <br> Groups | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pashtuns | $61.9 \%$ | $35.9 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ |
| Tajiks | $61.7 \%$ | $37.0 \%$ | $1.2 \%$ |
| Hazara | $51.1 \%$ | $46.7 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ |
| Uzbek | $64.3 \%$ | $33.4 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ |

Table 46: Restricting musical programs in the media - Level of Education

| Level of Education | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Illiterate | $38.1 \%$ | $58.8 \%$ | $2.9 \%$ |
| Primary School | $35.1 \%$ | $63.5 \%$ | $1.2 \%$ |
| High School Graduate | $30.4 \%$ | $69.1 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ |
| University Graduate | $30.3 \%$ | $69.6 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ |
| Post Graduate/ <br> Masters Degree | $28.2 \%$ | $70.6 \%$ | $1.0 \%$ |

Table 47: Restricting musical programs in the media - Age

| Age Groups | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $18-25$ | $63.3 \%$ | $35.2 \%$ | $1.4 \%$ |
| $26-35$ | $60.0 \%$ | $38.1 \%$ | $1.7 \%$ |
| $36-45$ | $60.4 \%$ | $37.4 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ |
| $46-55$ | $53.5 \%$ | $43.9 \%$ | $2.5 \%$ |
| $56+$ | $55.8 \%$ | $42.3 \%$ | $1.8 \%$ |

Table 48: Restricting musical programs in the media - Gender

| Gender | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | $59.6 \%$ | $38.4 \%$ | $1.8 \%$ |
| Male | $61.2 \%$ | $37.0 \%$ | $1.6 \%$ |

### 4.4 RESTRICTING ENTERTAINMENT PROGRAMS

Are you in favor of restricting entertainment programs in the media?
Figure 13: Restricting entertainment programs in the media- Total Distribution


Table 49: Restricting entertainment programs in the media - Ethnicity

| Ethnic <br> Groups | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pashtuns | $33.3 \%$ | $64.8 \%$ | $1.5 \%$ |
| Tajiks | $31.9 \%$ | $67.6 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ |
| Hazara | $30.2 \%$ | $69.1 \%$ | $0.5 \%$ |
| Uzbek | $36 \%$ | $61.7 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ |

Table 50: Restricting entertainment programs in the media - Ethnicity

| Level of <br> Education | Yes | No | Refuse to <br> answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Illiterate | $38.1 \%$ | $58.8 \%$ | $2.9 \%$ |
| Primary School | $35.1 \%$ | $63.5 \%$ | $1.2 \%$ |
| High School Graduate | $30.4 \%$ | $69.1 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ |
| University Graduate | $30.3 \%$ | $69.9 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ |
| Post Graduate/Masters Degree | $28.2 \%$ | $70.6 \%$ | $1.0 \%$ |

Table 51: Restricting entertainment programs in the media - Age

| Age Groups | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $18-25$ | $31 \%$ | $68.1 \%$ | $0.7 \%$ |
| $26-35$ | $33.1 \%$ | $65.9 \%$ | $0.8 \%$ |
| $36-45$ | $32.8 \%$ | $65.7 \%$ | $1.3 \%$ |
| $46-55$ | $36.5 \%$ | $62.2 \%$ | $1.2 \%$ |
| $56+$ | $38.1 \%$ | $58.1 \%$ | $3.7 \%$ |

Table 52: Restricting entertainment programs in the media - Gender

| Gender | Yes | No | Refuse to answer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | $28.3 \%$ | $70.6 \%$ | $0.9 \%$ |
| Male | $34.1 \%$ | $64.8 \%$ | $1.0 \%$ |

5. ATTITUDE ANALYSIS


## ATTITUDE ANALYSIS

In order to reflect people's attitude towards the position of the government of Afghanistan and that of the Taliban movement, OSRA adapted psychometric testing techniques to analyse where the people stand. The answer options of the survey were weighted on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the position of the government of Afghanistan and 10 that of the Taliban. An average score for each participant was calculated and used as tendency indicator for further analysis.

Figure 14: Answers' distribution along corresponding friendly positons- All Participants



### 5.1 EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND \& TENDENCY

The survey revealed that the higher the level of education, the closer an individual preferred the position of the government of Afghanistan. Except for the group of the illiterate participants who had an average score of 5.1, all the other groups were leftleaning i.e., they were increasingly closer to the position of the government.

Table 53: Attitude tendency based on level of educational background

| Level of Education | Percentage | Score |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Illiterate | $20.9 \%$ | 5.05 |
| Primary Education | $23.9 \%$ | 4.88 |
| High School | $33.3 \%$ | 4.47 |
| Bachelor | $19.7 \%$ | 4.05 |
| Master | $1.9 \%$ | 3.95 |
| Doctorate | $0.1 \%$ | 3.87 |

Figure 15: Answers' distribution along corresponding friendly positions based on level of educational


### 5.2 GENDER TENDENCY

The overall attitude of women and men towards the position of the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban movement was nearly the same as that of the total participants. Women, however, were slightly more inclined towards the position of the government.

Table 54: Attitude tendency based on gender

| Gender | Percentage | Score |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Female | $25.3 \%$ | 4.23 |
| Male | $74.7 \%$ | 4.71 |

Figure 16: Answers' distribution along corresponding friendly positions based on gender


### 5.3 ETHNIC TENDENCY

All the ethnic groups had more-or-less a similar position on the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban movement, (ranging between 2.9 to 4.9).
The majority of the large ethnic groups revealed centralist tendencies. Pashtuns with score of 4.9 constituted a position closest to the center. This was followed by Uzbekswith an average of 4.8 , Tajiks at 4.5 and Hazaras at 4.0 closest to the poisiton of the government.

Table 55: Attitude tendency based on ethnicity

| Ethnicity | Percentage | Score |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Pashtun | $40.6 \%$ | 4.85 |
| Tajik | $37.2 \%$ | 4.46 |
| Hazara | $10.0 \%$ | 4.01 |
| Uzbek | $4.4 \%$ | 4.78 |
| Not Id. | $2.3 \%$ | 4.39 |
| Sadat | $1.5 \%$ | 4.24 |
| Turkmen | $1.2 \%$ | 4.54 |
| Arab | $0.8 \%$ | 4.67 |
| Pashayi | $0.5 \%$ | 4.80 |
| Baloch | $0.4 \%$ | 4.29 |
| Qizilbash | $0.2 \%$ | 3.65 |
| Nuristani | $0.2 \%$ | 4.90 |
| Aimaq | $0.1 \%$ | 2.93 |
| Kochi | $0.1 \%$ | 4.78 |
| Hindu | $0.02 \%$ | 3.85 |

Figure 17: Answers' distribution along corresponding friendly positions based on ethnicity


### 5.4 AGE TENDENCY

The overall attitude of people analysed along their age revealed that people have similar tendencies largely independent of their age group.

Table 56: Attitude tendency based on age

| Age | Percentage | Score |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $18-25$ | 43.2 | 4.60 |
| $26-35$ | 30.4 | 4.57 |
| $36-45$ | 14.6 | 4.61 |
| $46-55$ | 7.6 | 4.52 |
| $56+$ | 4.1 | 4.58 |

Figure 18: Answers' distribution along corresponding friendly positions based on age



## SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS

### 6.1 GENDER DISTRIBUTION

The male/female ratio of the collected sample was $74.7 \%$ male and $24.3 \%$ female. ${ }^{6}$
Figure 19: Gender Distribution


### 6.2 AGE DISTRIBUTION

The age distribution shows that $73.6 \%$ of the 5213 respondents surveyed were aged 35 years or younger.

Figure 20: Age Distribution


[^2]
### 6.3 Geographical Distribution

The survey covered all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. The sample size distribution largely mirrors the population distribution of the country. The higher number of participants from Kabul, Herat, Nangarhar, Kandahar and Balkh provinces is indicative of the concentrated population in these provinces; specifically, the major cities of Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif. High population density and better mobile connectivity makes it more likely for people living in these areas to be sampled.

Figure 21: Geographical Distribution


Figure 22: Ethnic Distribution




[^0]:    ${ }^{3}$ Iranian form of government and governance was an option intensely discussed among Afghan analysts and political circles throughout the rounds of talks with the US and the Taliban. It was seen as a viable third option.

[^1]:    ${ }^{4}$ For further reading please refer to the following literature:
    (1) Dabalen, A., et al., "Mobile Phone Panel Surveys in Developing Countries - A practical guide for Microdata Collection", The World Bank, 2016
    Link: Mobile Phone Panel Surveys in Developing Countries
    (2) Patnaik, S. et. "Evaluating the accuracy of data collection on mobile phones: A study of forms, SMS, and voice." International

    Conference on Information and Communication Technologies and Development (ICTD), 2009, 74-84.
    Link: Evaluating the Accuracy of Data Collection on Mobile Phones: A Study of Forms, SMS, and Voice

[^2]:    ${ }^{6}$ The reason for this skewness may be twofold: Firstly, if a household can afford only one mobile phone, it is more likely that the male head of the household will have primary access to that mobile phone and therefore be more likely to be sampled. Secondly, women are less likely to answer the phone if the caller is unknown. Hence, they are less likely to be sampled.

